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THE LEGAL CULTURE
JOHN P. MACKENZIE

It was plain folly for James Simon to declare, in the very title of his
book about the Supreme Court under Chief Justice William Rehnquist, that
"The Center Holds."' The preface announces the book and the blurb on
the dust jacket promotes it as the inside "story of a conservative judicial
revolution that failed." 2 That judgment-not that the center had held but
that the center holds-was premature when written and inaccurate by
publication time. It was risky and pretentious as journalism, to say
nothing of serious legal scholarship. It was pointless and improvident to
pronounce for even the short-range future on the basis of a few decisions,
even the centerpiece 1992 decision in Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey' decision in which the Court refused to overturn
Roe v. Wade. 4
Daily journalists like me, and weekly journalists such as Professor
Simon5 once was, are obliged to observe more self-restraint. Journalists
generally do not consider their job finished just because they deem their
reports accurate when written. They and their editors must worry the
copy through so that it is accurate upon publication. Authors of books,
tethered to the tyrannical lead time of book production, must take even
more pains. Theirs is the second draft of history, which ought to be more
accurate, more telling, than the first or journalistic draft, not less. Linda
Greenhouse, whose stunning 1992 story for The New York Times on the
eve of the Casey abortion decision captured the ideas and all but predicted
* John P. MacKenzie, an editorial writer for The New York Times, covered the
Supreme Court for The Washington Post from 1965 through 1976. He has taught law
without a license at New York University and SUNY Buffalo. He wrote The Appearance

of Justice (Scribners 1974) about ethical problems with Justices and Judges.
1. JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE
REHNQUIST COURT (1995).
2. Id. (front dust jacket flap).

3. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (affirming the central holding of Roe, and upholding a
woman's qualified right to choose an abortion without "undue burden" from the state by

striking down certain restrictions of the Pennsylvania abortion statute, while upholding
others).
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a Texas taw which criminalized
abortion and establishing a woman's qualified right under the Due Process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to choose an abortion).
5. James F. Simon was a correspondent and contributing editor at Time magazine
from 1969 to 1974 and is currently Martin Professor of Constitutional Law at New York
Law School.
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the result, 6 also had it right later as she summed up the Court's term.'
"The center held," her story reported'-and we'll see whether it continues
to hold. Professor Simon took several more years to get it wrong.
There would be no need to dwell on this criticism if Professor Simon
would stop insisting on his shattered thesis. Simon begins his defensive
Solomon Lecture by chiding a reviewer, Jeffrey Toobin 9 of the New
Yorker, for taxing him with other decisions "which, he [Toobin] conceded
were not decided when my book went to press."" ° That is an amazing
defense. Of course the Court decisions that disproved Professor Simon's
claim for a stabilized center were issued after the Casey ruling and another
highly contested case of the October 1991 term, the graduation prayer case
of Lee v. Weisman," a case he cites as further evidence of the center's
holding.' 2 Mr. Toobin and others have issued a very broad, blunt, and
accurate criticism, which is that Professor Simon's thesis was dead upon
announcement. The fascinating truth is that the center is still under siege
and it only sometimes holds.
Professor Simon's first defense is that if there was a revolution, it
didn't happen on his watch, which ended before publication. His second
defense, that even if there was a revolution, it has failed because it hasn't
fully succeeded yet, is somewhat more tenable. Yet what constitutes
success? Take a few of those cases that followed Casey.'3 Racing
6. See Linda Greenhouse, ChangedPathfor Court? New Balance Is Held by Three

Cautious Justices, N.Y. TImEs, June 26, 1992, at Al (discussing the moderate trend of
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in recent decisions and describing this as a new
phase for the Court which just one year earlier appeared to have a conservative
majority). The Casey decision was announced 3 days later, on June 29, 1992.
7. See Linda Greenhouse, Moderateson Court Defy Predictions,N.Y. TIMES, July

5, 1992, § 4, at 1.
8. Id.
9. See Jeffrey Toobin, Chicken Supreme, NEW YORKER, Aug. 14, 1995, at 81.

10. James F. Simon, Politics andthe Rehnquist Court,delivered as the Sixth Annual
Solomon Lecture at New York Law School (Oct. 31, 1995), in 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv.
863 (1996) (emphasis added).
11. 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992) (declining to revisit or expand the definition or
scope of Establishment Clause principles, and instead applying controlling precedents in
holding that commencement prayer violated the Establishment Clause).
12. See SIMON, supra note 1, at 281.
13. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995)
(requiring strict scrutiny in all racial classifications, whether imposed by a federal, state,
or local government actor); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995)
(denying a state's right to impose qualifications for senators and congressman in addition
to those prescribed by the Constitution; Justices Thomas, Rehnquist, O'Connor and
Scalia dissented); Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994) (denying a vote dilution
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rightward, in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the Court came within
one vote of casually standing federalism on its head, as four dissenters
argued that the states had the power to limit the terms of members of the
national legislature. 14 In Holder v. Hall it mugged, then nearly gutted,
the Voting Rights Act, in utter contempt of Congress.'" In Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, it ruled that efforts to racially and otherwise
diversify the work force must be subjected to the same judicially jaundiced
review previously reserved for hate-based racial discrimination.16
After the Casey decision the Court has actually managed to raise a
question thought settled five decades ago when Justice Harlan Fiske Stone
observed in United States v. Carolene Products Co. 7 that the Court's
priorities place more value on civil rights and individual liberties than on
claims based on property, contract, and commerce. 8 Decades of
deference to Congress over the scope of the power to regulate interstate
commerce were called into question as the Court struck down a federal
law, admittedly on the fringe of that power, forbidding possession of a
gun near a school. 9 As we go to press, the same majority's surprising
sweep in ruling for the state in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida?
shows that the center is not only not holding, it is being battered.
The vapidity of Professor Simon's explanation for the alleged failure
of the conservative revolution should have warned everyone, including
Simon, of just how shaky his thesis is. Simon says, "The center held
largely because liberal Justices were able to attract support from their
more moderate brethren who refused to join the ideologically committed
conservatives on the right wing of the Court."2 That is not analysis, nor
is it a conclusion that exploits the author's access to newly available Court
papers or his own reporting. It was illuminating, though painful, to
challenge brought by black voters and the local chapter of the NAACP under § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act).
14. See U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1875.
15. See Holder, 114 S. Ct. 2581.
16. See Adarand Constructors, 115 S. Ct. 2097.
17. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
18. Id. at 152 n.4 (Justice Stone's famous footnote called for "more searching
judicial inquiry" where there are claims of prejudice against "discrete and insular
minorities").
19. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (limiting the scope of
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause by holding that possession of a gun
within a school zone is not an economic activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce).
20. 64 U.S.L.W. 4167 (Mar. 27, 1996).
21. SIMON, supra note 1, at 12.
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observe the reaction of Richard Bernstein who reviewed the book in The
New York Times: "There is, after all, a circularity to that overall
conclusion in which Mr. Simon says not much more than that the center
held because there was always a majority at the center."' There is not
much point in telling "the inside story," to refer again to the dust jacket
blurb,' if the story is about something that did not happen.
So much for what did not happen. What did? And since we now
know that the struggle is not over, what is this struggle about, anyway?
Tell us something positive, Mr. Critic. We know what you're against.
What are you for? I'll respond briefly, though it risks perpetrating a hated
reviewer's ploy: criticizing the author for not writing the book the critic
had wanted to read rather than the one that the author wrote. Mine is
only an example of what might make more effective use of the fascinating
subject matter Professor Simon treats.
I would begin by broadening the inquiry from the narrowly political.
Politics and the Rehnquist Court, the title of the lecture we are
commenting upon, betrays that narrowness. I see the Center not so much
as a place useful for winning cases, but as the place where the law should
be. The right-wing challenge is not merely to overrule a few cases. It is
rather, as Robert Bork defined it during his confirmation fight, "[a] battle
[over] . . . our legal culture."'
The assault on centrist law, as it
developed for over half a century, goes well beyond civil rights and civil
liberties. It embraces the entire nature of the federal system, even the
constitutional basis of federal commerce power, until recently assumed
settled. The new revolutionaries claim not only the votes to upset old
precedents, but more basically the high intellectual and moral ground.
Witness, for example, the profusion of right-wing think-tanks,1 "public
interest" law firms and symposia that parody the institutions of civil rights
and liberties organizations.' Notice also the windy, scholarly looking
22. Richard Bernstein, How Nino, Tony, the Chief et al. Make Decisions, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 1, 1995, at C26.
23. See SIMON, supra note

1.

24. See Bork Lashes out at Liberals, Media, UPI, Feb. 13, 1988, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. Robert Bork is quoted as saying, "[M]y nomination
became the battle ground in a campaign for control of our legal culture." Id.
25. See generallyDAVID M. RICCI, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS

(1993) (documenting the multiplication and expansion of the right-wing think-tanks in
Washington since the 1970s).
26. See generally Richard Perez-Pena, A Rights Movement That Emerges From the

Right, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1994, at B6 (discussing conservative groups claiming to be
fighting for the rights of oppressed people, although the represented people are not
normally associated with oppressed status but instead are whites, men, and property

owners); see also Gustav Niebuhr, Conservatives'New Frontier:Religious Liberty Law
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dissents of Justice Clarence Thomas 7 and the tank of right-wing
The old centrist law
commentators lauding his sound scholarship.'
much with the
have
bothered
not
to
journals and most commentators seem

merits of the Thomas dissents. They should, though, for the opinions
embody many a revolutionary idea, however impoverished their reasoning.

His arguments supporting state-imposed term limits on Congress,29 for
repudiating civil rights remedies" and for striking down the Voting
Rights Acte3' are tedious and silly-but not to be ignored, if only because
today's dissent can, without being a great dissent, become tomorrow's

law.
Result-oriented from start to finish, Professor Simon fails to treat the

intellectual ingredients of the decisions he studies.

If he took on the

merits more thoroughly, he would not hold still while the right-wing
He could also help us
jurisprudes claim intellectual superiority.
understand why the fight is worth fighting. I will rest my case on one
example, but one that is typical of his treatment of cases, issues, legal
arguments and the merits of overrulings or of adherence to precedent.

His opening case, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,3" serves well.

To say that the issue was whether to overrule the 1976 case of Runyon v.
Firms, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1995, at Al (discussing "religious conservatives . . .
creating their own legal organizations to combat what they see-as a broad assault on
religious liberties").
27. See, e.g., Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S. Ct. 457, 467 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a state trial judge is in the best position to decide the question
of Miranda custody); Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting from the denial of certiorari in a case where the Army Corps of
Engineers asserted jurisdiction over private property under the Clean Water Act).
28. See, e.g., Edwin Meese, The Illusion ofthe Rehnquist Court'sPoliticalAgenda:
A Return to ConstitutionalInterpretationFrom JudicialLaw-Making, 40 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REv. 925 (1996) (applauding President Bush's appointment of Clarence Thomas as
"[giving] the Country a Supreme Court Justice who is unsurpassed by any present or
prior member of the Court in his understanding of, and fidelity to, the Constitutional role
of the Judiciary"); see also Garry Wills, ClarenceThomas, Out of Touch, TIMES UNION
(Albany, NY), Sept. 23, 1995, at A7 (discussing Thomas's right-wing and conservative
supporters).
29. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1875 (1995) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
30. See Thompson, 116 S. Ct. at 467 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
31. Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2591 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (issuing
a 34-page opinion, joined by Justice Scalia, stating that the Voting Rights Act should not
have been used to create new voting districts, that the Court had misused the law for the
past 30 years).
32. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
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McCrary'3 almost trivializes what was at stake when Patterson was
argued twice and decided in 1992. At stake was a basic approach to the
realization, a century after the post-Civil War amendments, of the
constitutional promise that had been dishonored by the nineteenth century
Supreme Court. Those amendments provided not only for racial equality
but for Congressional power to enforce that valueY The Court had
made the enforcement provisions dead letters, leaving for dead statutes
like the 1866 law granting equal rights "to make and enforce
contracts. " 35
The Supreme Court's recognition of this broad
congressional power in the mid-1960s came nearly a century late, but in
time to spur on the efforts of other branches of government to carry
forward the rights advances the Court itself had begun with Brown v.
Board of Education36 and subsequent cases. In civic terms this was
judicial responsibility at its best, judicial restraint as the right wing never
recognizes it, a deference to the legislature that encourages democratic
processes and does the judiciary proud.
In the 1968 case Jones v.
Mayer,37 the High Court thrillingly gave new life to those enforcement
sections and applied the century-old law to a modern case of
discrimination in real estate dealings.38
In Runyon,39 the Court
extended the equal contractual right to employment relationships, posing
the Patterson4 issue of whether the 1866 law forbade racial harassment,
a species of job discrimination.4" After oral argument, the Court set the
case for reargument, adding the question whether Runyon should be
overruled.4' More than Runyon was at stake. Its underpinnings in Jones
v. Mayer 3 and its principle that Congress should be given broad leeway
to vindicate civil rights-to go beyond even what the courts had had
33. 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits private
discrimination in making and enforcing contracts); comparePatterson, 491 U.S. at 172.
34. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, § 2, XIV, § 5, XV, § 2.
35. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981); compare
Patterson, 491 U.S. at 180-81.
36. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
37. 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 bars private as well as
public discrimination with regard to the sale or rental of property and that the enactment
of this legislation was a valid exercise of Congressional power under the Thirteenth
Amendment).

38. Id. at 413.
39. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).

40. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
41. Id. at 170.
42. Id. at 188-89.
43. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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occasion to declare-were up for grabs. Congress,. shamefully dormant
for decades in this century, risked being put to sleep again only a few
years after being roused to pass the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965
Voting Rights Act, and other advances.
Against this background, the Court's ultimate adherence to Runyon 4
was a relief, but Justice Anthony Kennedy's surrender to stare decisis45
was disappointingly, and ominously, grudging. Still more disappointing
was his majority judgment that although the 1866 law did indeed still
cover job discrimination, it did not cover Ms. Patterson's situation.' 6 If
she suffered harassment in the workplace, said the Court, it did not
interfere with her ability "to make and enforce contracts."' That was
an absurd, counter-factual reading of contractual arrangements, effectively
ruling that Ms. Patterson could make a contract for a decent place to work
but could not enforce it through a lawsuit. That interpretation was so far
out of the legal mainstream that within two years Congress reversed it,'
along with several other 1989 Supreme Court misinterpretations of civil
rights law, with clear strengthening language.4 9 If that string of
erroneous job discrimination decisions was not part of a revolution that
was succeeding, it is only because the rulings were so revolting that
Congress legislatively repudiated them.
Other cases deserve comparable broad treatment so that the
"conservative" revolution is understood as the multi-front war that it is.
Roe v. Wade50 has proved a centrist opinion, a creative balance of rights
among the woman, the state and the developing fetus, and the Casey5
decision coincided with widening public and political awareness of that
centrism. If abortion were all, the center has held for a few years. But
why are the Justices bolting rightward on other fronts? The holding
pattern of the October 1991 term does not cover all realms of ideology.
Perhaps Justices Kennedy and O'Connor no longer find the Court's
reputation for judicial independence and integrity on the line when, as
44. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171.
45. Id. at 172.
46. Id. at 177-80.
47. Id. at 179.
48. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 171 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Congress added subsections (b) and (c) which
define the term "make and enforce contracts" and specifically protect against nongovernmental discrimination.

49. See 42 U.S.C § 1981(b), (c).
50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
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opposed to the long-contested abortion issues, the questions are about term
limits, voting rights, and economic federalism, even though those issues
implicate the ongoing would-be revolution. The judiciary needs a
progressive centrism- not "dead center" where nothing moves, but a
rational, moderate view of the Constitution and a faithfulness to laws that
informs, and is informed by, a worthy legal culture.

